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Joseph Forderer
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INTRODUCTION
The federal courtroom has become a prominent forum for
addressing the issue of global warming in the United States.' In the face
of federal inaction on the issue, states have banded together to become
plaintiffs, winning several major global warming victories in the
courtroom. The most significant state sponsored victory to date on the
issue was in 2007 in Massachusetts v. EPA, 2 where twelve states
succeeded in getting the court to force the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as
pollutants. More recently, eight states won a major interim victory in the
Second Circuit in a case filed against several large fossil fuel-burning
power plants located in approximately twenty other states. The case,
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,3 was allowed to go forward
on a federal common law public nuisance theory of global warming.4 This
state sponsored litigation approach to tackling global warming is the
byproduct of the United States' system of federalism, in which individual
states have the Constitutional authority to fill in the gaps of a lagging
' See Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., http://www.climatecasechart.com (last
visited Sept. 5, 2010).
2 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. pending, Docket No. 10-174.
4 The lawsuit was brought by, inter alia, Connecticut, New York, Iowa, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin against power plants in at least 18 different states.
Id. at 316. The complaint sought "an order requiring defendants to reduce their emissions
of carbon dioxide, thereby abating their contribution to global warming, a public
nuisance." Complaint at 1 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp.2d 265
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 104CV05669), 2004 WL 5614397 [hereinafter Connecticut
Complaint]. It cited damages caused by global warming that particularly affect the
residents of their state including, increased heat deaths due to more heat waves, beach
erosion, more ground level smog, salinization of drinking water due to higher sea levels,
reduction of the snowpack in California which provides critical drinking water and the
lowering sea levels of the Great Lakes which impedes commercial shipping. Id. at 1 3.
The case was initially dismissed by the district court as non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine but this ruling was vacated by the Second Circuit which found that the
case did not present a non-justiciable political question, the parties had standing to bring
the suit, the plaintiffs had stated a claim under federal common law of nuisance and the
claims were not displaced by federal legislation. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 392. The case
was then remanded back to district court. Id at 393.
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federal government. In certain circumstances, states may even offer
alternative approaches to the same problems that the federal government
are addressing.5  Litigation has been a prominent pathway for states to
utilize their distinct sovereignty. 6 Within the past few decades, litigation
has been a powerful tool that has been used by the states to influence
public policy on a national level. From addressing the health risks of big
tobacco to implementing securities regulation, the states have made their
voices heard on a number of important issues through state sponsored
litigation.8 Therefore, it is not surprising that in the face of inaction and
disappointing results on the global warming issue from the federal
authorities,9 the states have tried to prod the national government into action
s Subject, of course, to the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
6 The primary mechanism used for a state to achieve standing in these suits is parens
patriae, an ancient common law doctrine which is "inherent in the supreme power of
every state ... [and is] often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity."
Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 334 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-
Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)).
7 There is a trend among state attorneys generals to influence public policy and
promulgate "regulation by litigation." Jonathan H. Adler, Business, The Environment,
and The Roberts Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 966
(2009); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of
Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1503-04 (2009).
8 More than forty states commenced litigation against tobacco product manufacturers and
were able to enter into a huge settlement with the tobacco companies that significantly
changed the entire industry. See Richard P. leyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney
General Actions, The Tobacco Litigation and The Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L.
REV. 1859, 1859 (2000); CAL. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT (1992), http://www.ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdflmsa.pdf. More recently, state
attorneys general have been taking an active role in securities litigation. See David
Wasick & Joseph J. Tabacco Jr., Navigating the Waters ofSecurities Litigation 12 NEV.
LAW., Sept. 2004, at 18, 18.
9 The most explicit example of this is the U.S. refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol, which
was joined by almost all other industrialized nations. Jeff Civins et al., Environmental
Due Diligence - Counting Carbon, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 37, 37 (2009).
Generally, it has been the states and not the federal government whom have been most
active in addressing Global Warming. See Michael C. Davis & David L. Feinberg, State
Little NEPA Statutes and the Effort to Forestall Climate Change, 565 PRACTISING L.
INST. 413, 419 (2009); Symposium, Global Warming Panel, Part II, 30 COLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 351, 366 ("It is fair to say that there is not much happening on a federal level
in dealing with climate change."); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1617-18 (2007)
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with litigation'o and are now in the process of unilaterally addressing the
issue with Connecticut.
State sponsored global warming litigation raises significant
federalism issues because it both positions states against each other" and
arguably trespasses on a public policy realm that should be left to the
federal government.12 The primary issue to be addressed in this Article is
whether Connecticut represents a beneficial use of our federalist system.
The article will not focus on the details of Connecticut itself, or whether it
was rightly decided (i.e., issues surrounding the requirements of parens
patriae, the federal common law, the political question doctrine, et
cetera).' 3 Rather, the primary focus will be on whether the lawsuit
actually embodies the values of our federal structure and uses them to
effectively address global warming and to achieve the goals our duel
sovereignty system has been designed to address. The issue as framed
relies on the assumption that federalism should be used "to maximize the
benefits of regulation at many levels of government."' 4  Ideally, when
there are multiple ways of approaching an issue, one should determine
"[w]hich approach does a better job of finding the appropriate balance
between state and federal authority in today's world."' 5 This admittedly
functionalist approach assumes that our federalist structure should be
utilized in a way that maximizes the aggregate social benefit to our
("the actual federal track record has been one of backpedaling and half measures, while
some states and local governments have taken a leading role").
10 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
1 The eight states in Connecticut v. American Electric Power are suing power plants
located in other states. 582 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, the suit represents the
Power of one state to directly attack economic actors located in another state.For example, the suit might impede the federal government with its foreign affairs
policy. See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLuM. J.
ENvTL. L. 293, 319-20 (2005). It also might lead to a lack of consistency and uniformity
among states which can lead to many problems and complications. See Robert B.
McKinstry Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Implications of the New "Old" Federalism in
Climate-Change Litigation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take
the Lead, 20 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 61, 89-92 (2007). This issue
will be discussed more thoroughly infra, Part II.
13 For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Thomas W. Merrill, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENvEL. L. 293, 294 (2005).
14 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MiNN. L. REv. 317, 321 (1997).
15 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1503 (1994).
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citizenry as a whole.' 6 Here, that benefit can be thought of as both the end
result of the Connecticut litigation (i.e., the environmental and economic
outcome) and the means of litigation in itself (i.e., the values perpetuated
and reinforced by the state-sponsored suit). The analysis will proceed
with a discussion of whether Connecticut fulfills the goals and values of
federalism.
When analyzed with this framework, Connecticut can be
characterized as an abuse of the federalist structure because it fails to
advance the values underlying federalism and it represents an inefficient
solution to global warming. Federalism cannot be used to justify this
radical approach, since most of the federalist values (as articulated below)
are not served by Connecticut. Additionally, federalism is not served
since the case fails to advance a truly substantive solution to global
warming and represents a deleterious use of our federal structure.
Part I will lay the environmental and federalism foundations for
this Article and put the lawsuit in a broader context. It will articulate a
concrete set of the values of federalism and will look at previous state
sponsored litigation in the interstate pollution context. Part II will then
apply the goals and values of federalism to Connecticut to illustrate that
the case is not actually an appropriate means of achieving these goals and
ultimately addressing global warming. Part III will revisit the federalist
values as applied to Connecticut and then briefly discuss the general role
of federalism in the global warming context.
16 The goal is to give a "real effort to understand the tangible benefits of [our] federal
system, [and] to take account of when governmental power sensibly is exercised at one
level or another." Friedman, supra note 14, at 317. The courts and politicians have
invoked the perceived benefits of federalism numerous times, but they are often at a very
high level of abstraction and have been characterized by numerous commentators as
merely politics-driven rhetoric. Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection:
Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REv. 329, 330-32 (2003).
Nevertheless, "Courts and politicians alike ... need a strong normative sense of how our
federal system of government ought to function." Id. It is with this normative and
benefits-driven emphasis that this article proceeds to adopt and apply the values of
federalism to the Connecticut case.
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PART I: FEDERALISM VALUES IN GENERAL
AND IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION CONTEXT
Federalism, which is the unique system of dual sovereignty
embedded in our government, is a concept found in the structure of the
Constitution itself and has formed the foundation of our government.17
The Framers "split the atom of sovereignty" creating "a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people."' 8  Over the years, courts and
commentators have fleshed out certain goals and values that justify and
are served by federalism.' 9 A non-exhaustive list of these values will be
discussed below. A brief overview of state-sponsored environmental
litigation and associated federalism concerns will follow.
A. The Values of Federalism
1. States as Laboratories
Justice Brandeis argued that our federalist system encourages
innovation by giving the states the power to use experimentation to remold
"our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and
economic needs." 20 The basic argument that states can act as laboratories
of experimentation to test new policy ideas is an important value served by
the federal structure of government. When used by state governments,
experimentation with various policy approaches can catalyze innovation
and creates the opportunity to implement novel ideas on a smaller scale to
test their feasibility.21 Therefore, federalism can be utilized to encourage
17 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425
(1987) (discussing the foundational roots of our federal structure).
18 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
19 The Court has never attempted to delineate an exhaustive or hierarchal list of
federalism values and I will not attempt to do so here.
20 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21 Justice O'Connor stated, "One of federalism's chief virtues . . . is that it promotes
innovation by allowing for the possibility that a 'single courageous State may, if the
28
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and facilitate states as laboratories. There are many examples where this
state-experimentation rationale has been used to advocate or justify state
authority in certain areas of law. These examples include solutions to
22 2324predatory lending, mine safety regulation,23 cybercrime, and health
care.25
2. Liberty
Additional federalism values flow from the fact that dual
sovereignty creates a decentralized system where power is not
concentrated in a single entity. This decentralization of power protects
individual liberty by creating a healthy balance of power and preventing
the threat of tyranny.26 The tension between the state and the federal
government leads to the promise of liberty for the individual.27 In the
Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton promised the following:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general
government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have
the same disposition towards the general government. The
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 45 (2005); see
also United States v. Lopez, 514, U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy J., concurring) ("States
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions
where the best solution is far from clear.").
22 See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as
Laboratories ofExperimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 302 (2005).
23 See Lesley Manley, Should States Serve as Laboratories for Mine Safety Regulation?,
41 ARIz. ST. L.J. 379, 379 (2009).
24 See Peter Swire, No Cop on the Beat: Underenforcement in E-commerce and
2Cybercrime, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 107, 122 (2009).2 See Darren Abernethy, Of State Laboratories and Legislative Alloys: How "Fair
Share" Laws Can Be Written to Avoid ERISA Preemption and Influence Private Sector
Health Care Reform in America, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1859, 1861 (2008).
26 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) ("[t]his separation of the
two spheres is one of the Constitution's structural protections of liberty"); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front").
27 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
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people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded
by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument
of redress. 28
Consequently, at least theoretically, each individual state has the right to
resist national intervention in certain areas of public life. 29 Although this
resistance may ultimately be trumped by the Supremacy Clause in tandem
with the all powerful Commerce Clause, such resistance might act as a
friction and a drag on the ability of federal government to pass laws, thus
checking any of the potential tyrannical impulses that the national
government might have.
This idea is very appealing in theory, yet its applicability to our
post-New Deal federal government is highly questionable. "In order for
federalism to have some meaning and to protect individual liberty,
Congress's Commerce power must be limited."3 1 With perhaps the
exception of guns in school zones32 and violence against women statutes, 33
the federal government has the power to regulate in practically any area of
activity due to the expanded role of the Commerce Clause. 34 For better or
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (lan Shapiro ed. 2009).29 Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius's Vision, 122 HARV. L. REv. 745, 747-
48 (2008).
30 Id. at 748-49.
31 Talene Nicole Megerian, Comment, Federal Regulation ofIsolated Wetlands: To Be or
Not to Be, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 184 n.202 (2002) (citing Jonathan H. Adler,
Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
and the Limits ofFederal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENvTL. L. 1, 4 (1999)).
32 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
33 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
34 This liberal interpretation of the Commerce Clause creates essentially a federal
government of unlimited scope. See Arthur B. Mark, III, Note, United States v.
Morrison, The Commerce Clause and the Substantial Effects Test: No Substantial Limit
on Federal Power, 34 CREIGHTON L. REv. 675, 675 n.4 (2001) ("[T]he substantial effects
test [for the Commerce Clause] created by the New Deal Court and continuing through
United States v. Lopez allows Congress to regulate all manner of social and economic
conduct well beyond what the Framers' intended."); see also Arthur B. Mark, III,
Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REv.
671, 691 (2004) ("Because the Commerce Clause is the predominant base of the modern
regulatory state .. . [its] interpretation necessarily dictates the scope of federal power.").
30
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worse, this means that any balance of power between the federal and state
governments may no longer exist as a practical matter and the federalist
check on tyranny (at least from a concentration of power perspective)
seems very weak. Since there are essentially no limits on federal power
due to the fact that the Commerce Clause operates as essentially a "blank
check" of power to the federal Congress, states may not act as any
meaningful check on the potential for the federal government to abuse its
unconstrained power. Although arguments have been made that state
governments can still protect individual liberty in other ways, by for
example serving as rallying points for opposition to national policy, the
actual liberty-protecting force of that role is highly questionable. 36
Consequently, the liberty value of federalism has been diluted over time.
3. Efficiency
Efficiency and flexibility are also additional benefits that flow
from a system that has two distinct sovereigns. "[S]ometimes it is more
efficient to have action at the national level and sometimes at the local."
Certain issues might be more appropriately addressed at the state level
whereas others might require and deserve exclusively national attention.
For example, national control might be more appropriate when there is a
risk of a "race to the bottom" among the states or when regulation at the
3 See Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
874, 885 (2006) ("[S]tate governments check the power of the center by serving as
rallying points for opposition to national policy; by providing the seedbeds of political
change at the national level by facilitating competition between political parties; and by
articulating alternative (and often broader) understandings of federal rights."); see also
Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1284-90 (2004).
36 Some scholars have even argued that federalism has been used to limit individual
liberty. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
911, 914 (2001) ("[C]onservatives have used federalism as a rhetorical tool to argue for
results that were clearly 'rights regressive."') Others have argued that there is very little
authentic restraining power in court-enforced federalism since it is selectively invoked
only when ideologically convenient. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304, 1306 (1999).
n Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions ofFederalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1790
(2006).
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state level might create externalities that negatively affect other states. 3 8
Federal control is also beneficial when national uniformity simply makes
sense.
4. Diversity
Issues that involve local and cultural diversity should be addressed
on the state level.4 0 The U.S. population is very heterogeneous and has a
diverse set of needs that should, in certain circumstances, be addressed by
the state government. Federalism is a refuge for multiculturalism and it
"ensures that 'government ... will be more sensitive to the diverse needs
of a heterogeneous society.' By enabling local majorities to pursue
distinctive policymaking preferences, it is hoped that federalism will
produce greater citizen satisfaction than can be accomplished by a unitary,
'one-size-fits-all' government."41 The unique regional diversity of our
nation is a national value that federalism promotes and preserves.
5. Public Participation and Political Accountability
An additional point to consider is the fact that state and local
governments are simply closer and more accessible to the population.
Consequently, when there is real power held by state governments, the
people are closer to concrete, substantive authority and there is a greater
opportunity for the people to be involved in meaningful self-governance.42
Participation in the political process is a valuable aspect of democracy,
and our federalist system should be structured in a way that encourages
useful participation by the population. With increasing public
participation rights, one should expect more direct information and
38 Friedman, supra note 14, at 406-08.
3 Id. at 408-09.
4Id. at 401-02.
41 Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balances in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REv. 503, 612 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Gregory v. United States, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
42 Friedman, supra note 14, at 389. Federalism can function as a mechanism for
promoting democracy and increasing public participation in government. Id
32
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pressure to flow straight to policy-makers. 43 When there are more access
points to policy-makers, the cost of participation is reduced and interested
parties can more directly influence government officials.44 Since a
potential participant can engage the government on a federal, state, or
local level, there are simply more opportunities to be involved. More
opportunities mean that a greater percentage of the population can
participate and that there are more avenues for an individual to petition the
government for policy change. The creation of participation opportunities
is an important goal served by the federalist structure of our government.
A strong, decentralized federal system should be set up to foster
accountability. Ideally, the government should be directly responsible to
the people for their actions. Although both state and federal officials are
elected by their constituents and thus are politically accountable to the
people, states are arguably more accountable, as they are simply closer to
the citizenry. As one commentator has put it, "[o]fficials, elected and
appointed, should be available for public comment, anger, approval,
suggestions, and ideas about the course of public affairs. They should be
accessible, by phone, by fax, by e-mail. Of course, the fewer layers of
staff one has to go through, the better." 45 States are better positioned to be
held accountable due to their close proximity to the people, and federalism
should be tailored to favor this heightened accountability. Additionally,
the division between state and federal actions and responsibilities should
be made clear in order to ensure that the people know who to hold
responsible for a particular problem or policy.46 "[C]onfusion over the
lines of political responsibility is unacceptable in a republican
government; in order to fulfill the ideal of popular control, the citizens
43 Andrew J. Green, Public Participation, Federalism and Environmental Law, 6 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 169, 170 (1999).
44See id. at 177, 179; Multiple points of access are particularly valuable for participants
when each respective access point is controlled by a separate party. Id. Where one
channel might be blocked, another might be more receptive to a particular participant's
ideas.
45 Friedman, supra note 14, at 395.
4 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("Where Congress
encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain
responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the
people. By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.").
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must know which officials are responsible for unpopular legislation.
Federalism should be tailored to facilitate clear accountability.
6. Competing Sovereigns
On two separate levels, federalism facilitates the competition of
sovereigns for the attention and respect of the people. Such competition
leads to a more optimal solution for the constituents of the nation as a
whole, similar to the context of neo-classical economics, where
competition in the free market leads to an optimal equilibrium that
benefits consumers. 48 On one level, states compete against each other for
a mobile populace. In this "horizontal competition model," individuals
can "vote with their feet" by choosing to move to the state they find has
the most favorable laws and spends its resources in an optimal way.49 As
a result, federalism incentivizes states to create laws and services that are
attractive to the people with the ultimate beneficiary of this behavior being
citizens and consumers.o States compete with each other for citizens by
passing certain laws that are more responsive to the needs of the
citizenry.5 1
On a second level, states compete with the federal government
itself for the attention of the people. This has been labeled the "vertical
47 Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 62 (1988).
48 In the context of antitrust law, the Supreme Court has said, "the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources,
the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress." N. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
49 Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REv. 1517, 1534 (2009) (citing Charles Tiebout, A
Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (discussing the inter-
jurisdictional competition between states)).
5o Jan K. Brueckner & Luz A. Saavedra, Do Local Governments Engage in Strategic
Property-Tax Competition?, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 203, 205 (2001) ("[A] long line of research
has shown that intergovernmental competition benefits consumers by generating a variety
of public-good choices within a metropolitan area. This variety, which emerges as local
governments compete to attract residents, leads to an equilibrium in which consumers
self-select into different communities according to their demand for public goods.").
51 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
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competition model" where regulatory power is distributed as a result of
competition between the federal government and the states for the
"people's affection."52 This notion of vertical competition is very
eloquently expressed in an article by Todd Pettys, who states the
following:
Each time a government acts or refuses to act, it further
develops its reputation among its constituents. If a
government satisfactorily regulates a given matter, it can
expect to earn an added measure of its citizens' affection . .
. . The more areas that a government regulates
satisfactorily, the greater the affection it can expect to earn
and thus the greater the responsibilities it can expect
citizens to confer upon it. Because there are many areas in
which the state and federal governments' legislative powers
overlap, however, if one government regulates an activity
in an unsatisfactory manner, the people may be able to shift
responsibility to the other sovereign. 53
Consequently, the notions of both vertical and horizontal competition
serve as valuable objectives of the federalist system. Competition leads to
a better solution for the population as a whole and should be encouraged
wherever possible.
In sum, a non-exhaustive list of important federalism goals and
values are as follows: i) states as laboratories of experimentation; ii)
protection of individual liberties; iii) the fostering of local diversity; iv)
facilitation of efficiency; v) enhanced political participation and
accountability; and vi) the optimal equilibrium resulting from competing
sovereigns. These values are ideals in themselves that should be preserved
by our federal system, but they also serve as a means to better policy
solutions that are optimally designed to serve the needs of the people. In
Part II, these federalism values will be applied to Connecticut with
particular attention paid to whether such state-sponsored litigation
52 Note, Defending Federalism: Realizing Publius's Vision, 122 HARv. L. REv. 745, 749
(2008).
s3 Pettys, supra note 16, at 333.
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accomplishes two related goals. The first goal is to fulfill the population's
desire to effectively address global warming. The second goal is to
perpetuate a federalist structure that serves the aforementioned values and
actualizes the Framers' conception of true dual sovereignty.
First, however, it is beneficial to frame Connecticut in its historical
context and derive some additional federalist values from the federal
common law of nuisance. This is not the first time states have used
litigation to tackle environmental issues.
7. Federalism in the Context of Environmental Litigation: Protecting
Against Bias and Accommodating the Limited Sovereignty of States
A state's right to protect its natural resources has been widely
accepted as a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty. 54 Historically, the
theory of public nuisance has been an important means by which states
have used litigation to address environmental problems.55 Suits have been
brought by states both against in-state polluters (using state common law)
and against out-of-state polluters (using federal common law). Since
Connecticut involves interstate pollution, this Article will primarily focus
on the federal common law. Within the past century there have been
several cases involving the federal common law of public nuisance and
interstate pollution - most involving air or water pollution created in one
state flowing across state lines and negatively affecting the citizens in
another state.56 Using the federal common law of public nuisance, states
54 See Gloria Sefton, Calfornia's Not Dreamin': Federal Inaction on Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Provides an Opening for the State to Regulate, 30 WHITER L. REV. 101, 110
(2008).
ss See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit ofModern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923, 926-27 (1999). A public nuisance is
"an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 B(1). Conduct that unreasonably interferes
with the public health or safety may constitute a public nuisance. Id. § 821 (B)(2).
Usually, only government officials may sue on a public nuisance theory. Meiners &
Yandle, supra, at 927.
56 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (case involving
Tennessee copper manufacturers emitting noxious gas which entered Georgia); Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Illinois allegedly damaged by water pollution in
Lake Michigan which originated in cities in Wisconsin).
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can protect their citizens from environmental harm caused by other states
without having to petition the federal government for redress.
Federal common law is used in situations where there is "an
overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or
where the controversy touches basic interests of federalism."" One
reason to apply federal common law to situations involving interstate
pollution is the fear that a litigant from one state will not be able to get a
fair, impartial trial under the laws of another state. The primary concern
is that the plaintiff-state would adjust its own laws to ensure victory
against the interests in the other state.5 9 The fear of bias against out-of-
state environmental and industrial interests can be used as a justification
for the existence of the federal common law in the field of interstate
pollution. Federalism should be utilized in such a way that minimizes
interstate bias.
Another justification for the existence of federal common law in
this context is the fact that a federal court might be the only place for one
state to bring its grievances against another state peacefully. When states'
interests conflict which each other, the avenues of war and diplomacy are
not readily available as means of dispute resolution between states. Since
the Constitution of the United States forecloses these options, the
alternative is a lawsuit in federal court.6 0 "When a State enters the Union,
it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade
Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, [and] it
cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India." 61 This general
explanation for the necessity of a federal remedy was used in the earlier
" City ofMilwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964)).
58 Adopting the law of one of the states "would empower one the litigants to manipulate
the rule of decision and so defeat the goal of impartial adjudication. Therefore, out of
necessity, the Court was forced to apply federal common law." Thomas W. Merrill,
Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 310 (2005).
5 See Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Restructuring Public Nuisance and
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1845-46 (2008) (providing an explanation and
critique of this theory).
Id. at 1846.
61 Massachussets v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
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interstate pollution cases.62 By joining the Union, states have intrinsically
accepted limitations on their sovereignty 63 and the federal common law
has developed in order to accommodate this limitation.
The concerns of interstate bias and limited state sovereignty might
serve as additional justifications for suits brought under the federal
common law on a public nuisance theory, like Connecticut.M They are not
values served by federalism, but rather values serving federalism and may
consequently be used to justify certain actions as necessary for the
preservation of our federalist system. Application of these federalist
concerns to Connecticut will take place in Part II of this Article where all
federalism values articulated above will be used as a framework to assess
the potential benefits and detriments of the global warming suit.
PART II: AN IMPERFECT FIT: FEDERALISM VALUES APPLIED TO THE STATE
USE OF LITIGATION IN THE GLOBAL WARMING CONTEXT AS EMBODIED IN
CONNECTICUT
This section will apply the goals, values, and concerns of
federalism, as laid out in Part I of this Article, to the global warming
lawsuit, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. 65 The goal of this
section is not to assess whether Connecticut was rightly decided as a
matter of law. Rather, it seeks to suggest that Connecticut does not serve
the values federalism was designed to protect and is in fact incongruent
with the various rationales used to justify and reinforce federalism and
state action. It will also suggest why, through these federalism failures,
state-sponsored litigation is a poor means of addressing global warming.
62 See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) ("If Missouri were an independent
and sovereign state all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been surrendered
to the general government, it was to be expected that upon the latter would be devolved
the duty of providing a remedy, and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional
provisions we are considering.").
63 See Massachussets, 549 U.S. at 519.
6 See Zasloff, supra note 59, at 1845-47, for a critical view on the use of these arguments
to justify the use of the federal common law.
6' 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
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A. States as Laboratories
The U.S. system of federalism creates political sub-units at the
regional level that can try out unique and novel policies which, if
successful, can be readily implemented by other states or by the national
66government. It is tempting to apply this experimentation rationale to
Connecticut by arguing that the states are "experimenting" with a novel
approach to tackling global warming. That "experiment" is the use of
litigation as a mechanism used to reduce greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions. If successful, this approach could be repeated by other state
attorneys general against additional GHG emitters. In this sense, the eight
states in Connecticut are "experimenting" with a novel policy tool (i.e.,
litigation) that might lead to an "innovative" solution to global warming.
While the lawsuit is certainly a novel and unique approach to the
problem, it does not easily fit into Brandeis' notion of "states as
laboratories." 67  The laboratories idea rests on the assumption that the
policy ramifications of the experiment (whether good or bad) will be
confined to the experimenting states-i.e., that the experiment would be
implemented "without risk to the rest of the country."6 8 This clearly is not
the case in Connecticut, since the ultimate potential effect of the litigation
(i.e., nuisance abatement) 69 would be primarily felt by actors outside of the
experimenting states. 70 The plaintiff-states in Connecticut have created an
experiment that expands far beyond their borders by suing power plants
located in twenty other states. Therefore the experiment is not self-
contained and certain outside interests are essentially being
66 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).68 id.
69 The complaint requests the following relief against the out-of-state defendants:
"Permanently enjoining each defendant to abate its contribution to the nuisance by
requiring it to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade." Connecticut Complaint, supra note 4, at
Prayer for Relief
70 The plaintiff-states (California, Connecticut, New York, Iowa, New Jersey, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin) are suing firms with power plants located all across the
country in various states other than those bringing the lawsuit (e.g., Arkansas, Ohio,
Kentucky, West Virginia, Texas, Tennessee, Michigan, and Louisiana and Florida). Id.
at $117-34.
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commandeered to take part in an experiment in which they had no part in
creating. 1 Additionally, it is hard to categorize litigation as an
"experiment" at all. Litigation is a pressure tool, designed here, to force
power companies into action. It is not a program or solution fashioned as
a novel approach to tackling global warming; rather, it is an effort by
states to coerce others into action and to shift responsibility.
This litigation "experiment" is best contrasted with another
regional global warming experiment by a separate group of states, the
RGGI. 72 RGGI is "a cooperative effort . . . to limit greenhouse gas
emissions. RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based CO 2 emissions
reduction program in the United States."7 This experimental cap and
trade system will require a ten percent reduction in CO 2 emissions by
2018.74 This is a good example of states functioning as "laboratories of
innovation" due to the fact that states are implementing an innovative
policy and the effects of that policy are mostly self-contained. The system
only applies to CO2 emitters located within the participating states and
therefore, the primary brunt of the potential negative risks and
ramifications of the experiment are contained within the region that has
chosen to undertake the experiment.75 One of the risks that has the
n The analysis would be somewhat different if the plaintiff-states only sued GHG
emitters in their own states. In that case no out-of-state firms would be directly affected
and the experiment would arguably be contained to the experimenting states.
72 The states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
73 id
74 d
7s It could be argued that RGGI has extraterritorial effects because the in-state regulated
firms might have significant connections to out-of-state actors (e.g. if the firm sells
electricity to out-of-state consumers or is headquartered out-of-state). Yet in today's
interconnected economy, practically every in-state regulation could arguably have
extraterritorial effects given the fact that a regulation probably alters an entity's business
behavior by definition and that most entities business behavior affects out-of-state actors
to at least some extent. The repercussions of any state experiment can never be perfectly
confined to in-state actors as there will always be some externalities affecting out-of-
staters. However, it does not follow that there is no benefit in attempting to draw
distinctions between state experiments with minimal, incidental effects on out-of-staters
(like RGGI) and experiments where the primary effects are intended to be felt by out-of-
state actors (like Connecticut).
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potential to devastate in-state electricity producers is "leakage." This
phenomenon occurs when out-of-state electricity is imported into RGGI
states, taking away business from in-state producers who must comply
with the costly CO2 regulations.76 The potential deleterious effects of
leakage are felt by firms and their employees who are in the states that
have chosen to implement CO 2 regulations.7 7 Consequently, one of the
biggest risks of RGGI is self-contained within the laboratory states.
If the RGGI cap and trade system proves successful in the global
warming context, other states - or even the federal government - may
be enticed into implementing a similar system when regulating their own
industries. This is federalism in action: some states implement a novel,
risky policy with the other states on the sidelines watching and observing.
Observer states benefit because they have the opportunity to learn from
the experiences of the experimenting-states without being directly
involved in the experimental policy. This is not the case with the litigation
in Connecticut because polluters in other states are key actors in the
"experiment" whether they want to be or not. Consequently, the "states as
laboratories" rationale is not the best way to justify the Connecticut global
warming litigation.
B. Liberty
With the decentralization of power in our federalist system comes
the protection of individual liberty.78 When power is divided, the potential
threat of tyranny is reduced, thus protecting the individual. Even
assuming the federalism value of liberty still exists with the current
massive federal government and the rise of the Commerce Clause, this
value cannot be used to justify Connecticut. Liberty is protected by
limiting the government's power to act in certain areas.' 9 Indeed, Black's
Law Dictionary defines individual liberty as "[o]ne's freedom to do as one
pleases, limited only by the government's right to regulate the public
76 Eleanor Stein, Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Emissions, in GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 319 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007).
n Any attempt by RGGI states to impose costs or conditions on out-of-state electricity
Froducers would likely be challenged on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Id.
See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
79 id.
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health, safety, and welfare."80 A good example of this value being served
is found in cases like Morrison81 and Lopez82 where the court is limiting
the federal government's ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
Connecticut is doing the exact opposite - by allowing the case to go
forward it is actually expanding the government's power to regulate and
thus infringing upon individuals' rights. By providing states with the
opportunity to use public nuisance theory as an additional means for the
state to control the activities of private actors, the court is expanding the
government's power at the expense of individual liberty. Granted, we
might very well want the government to be able to regulate GHG
emissions and "infringe" on a power plant's liberty right to pollute, but the
point is that creating this litigation route to regulation does NOT protect
individual liberty; rather, it expands the government's opportunity to limit
individual liberty. The arguments surrounding whether Connecticut
makes sense as a policy matter will be further explored in the Efficiency
and Competing Sovereigns sections of this Article. 83
C. Efficiency
Our federalist structure facilitates specialization. Sometimes it just
makes sense to regulate a particular area of activity at the state level or at
the federal level. The state and the federal government are positioned
differently with respect to the people and each might be in a better place to
tackle a particular issue. From this perspective, each government should
specialize in tasks that it is most suited to tackle.85  The analysis will
proceed first with a discussion of the potential efficiency gains associated
with addressing global warming at the federal level as opposed to the state
level and then with a discussion of the benefits and detriments of the
8 0 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (9th ed. 2009).
8 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995).
82 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
83 See discussion infra Parts (II)(C), (II)(F).
84 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
85 For example, one commentator has argued that the national government is more suited
to tackle issues that need uniformity, require the supply of public goods at a national
level, or address interstate externalities or a race to the bottom. Friedman, supra note 14,
at 407-08. On the other hand, state governments are suited to protect cultural and local
diversity, protect citizens' health, safety and welfare, etc. Id. at 400-02.
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states' chosen tool, litigation. It is important to note that states have many
tools to address global warming, some of which may prove to be very
useful, but the analysis of this Article is confined to the tool used by the
states in Connecticut, which is the litigation tool.
1. State-by-State vs. a Federal Solution to Global Warming
GHGs are not localized pollutants. Once emitted into the
atmosphere, they travel around the planet; "thus a ton of CO2 that is
emitted over New York has the same effect on global warming as a ton
emitted over Paris, Shanghai, or Honolulu."86 No matter where the GHGs
are released, they equally affect the entire U.S. and for that matter, the
world; therefore, it makes sense to have a larger government entity to
address the issue, or at least one that has the capacity to address climate
change on a global scale.
The nature of global warming makes a federal (as opposed to a
state) solution the most efficient and appropriate choice of government to
regulate in this area due to the global nature of GHGs and the international
pervasiveness of the problem. All countries and continents are feeling
the effects of global warming. All regions are also contributing to the
emission of GHGs and thereby contributing to the exacerbation of the
8 Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND
U.S. LAW, supra note 76, at 5-6.
87 The analysis in this section is directed solely at the question of which level of
government is best equipped and situated to address the Global Warming issue. It is not
intended as commentary on any potential benefits derived from Connecticut which are
unrelated to efficiency, such as prodding the federal government into action, or certain
participation or accountability values, which will be addressed in other sections of the
article. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). This section
is intended to determine which level of government is more institutionally equipped to
address Global Warming, without looking at whether respective governments are actually
doing something related to the issue.
8 8 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007
SYNTHEsIs REPORT, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. [hereinafter 2007 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT]. Global Warming
includes not only a steady rise in the average temperatures around the world since around
1900, but also wind patterns and temperature extremes. Id at 40.
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problem, although some nations are contributing more than others.89
Addressing global warming on an international level is absolutely
essential, especially since any attempt to unilaterally address the problem
would likely prove futile because even a significant reduction in GHG
emissions by a single country alone would do little to stop the overall
trend toward higher global average temperatures. 90 Additionally, global
action is needed to coerce participation in reducing GHG emissions since
independent action by single countries seems highly unlikely not only
because global warming represents the standard "tragedy of the commons"
89 The U.S. and Canada contribute around 19% of total GHG emissions, Europe around
11% and East Asia around 17%. Id. at 37 (giving regional distribution of GHG emissions
by population and by GDP). For a discussion linking human activity and GHG emissions
to Global Warming see id. at 35-41. See also Myles R. Allen et al., Warming Caused by
Cumulative Carbon Emissions Towards the Trillionth Tonne, 2009 NATURE 458;
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (Solomon, S.D. Qin et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) ("Most
of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is
very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations .
. . Discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean
warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature extremes and wind patterns.").
90 Even a large country acting unilaterally, would not be able to adequately mitigate
Global Warming. For example, even if Global C02 emissions were reduced by 30% by
2050 (which would be a bigger cut in emissions than a scenario where the United States
stopped emitting ALL of its C02), the global average temperature will potentially have
increased to 3.2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 2007 IPCC SYNTHESIS
REPORT, supra note 88, at 67. This number is large, especially when compared to the 2.0
degrees Celsius possibility where global emissions are reduced on a much larger scale.
Id.; see also Jennifer S. Bales, Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone
Depletion, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 264 (1996) ("'[o]zone depletion clearly
affects all members of the international community,' and the unilateral actions taken by
one country cannot protect it from the potential harms"). It has been estimated that
worldwide C02 emissions must reduce to 80% of the current level in order to stabilize
the climate. Eleanor Stein, Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra note 76, at 323. The U.S. cannot reach
this level alone as it produces approximately 21% of the world's GHG and it is
unrealistic to think it possible that any country could reduce their emissions entirely.
Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW, supra note 76, at 6. Therefore international cooperation on the matter is essential,
since even the world's largest GHG emitter cannot solve the problem unilaterally.
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scenario, 91 but also because any unilateral action would be politically
unpopular and extremely detrimental to the domestic economy. Unilateral
action puts the regulating nation at a significant competitive disadvantage
with respect to other unregulated countries due to the fact that reducing
GHG emissions is economically costly. 92  Consequently, concerted
international effort is needed to find a truly global, effective solution.93
"Such an international solution will require strenuous diplomatic efforts-
the negotiation of treaties, creation of multilateral institutions, [and the]
development of enforcement mechanisms." 94  This is why the federal
government's exclusive constitutional authority over foreign affairs is a
crucial factor to consider when determining which level of government is
best positioned to address global warming. 95
The international scope of the problem and the need for an
international solution call for action by the federal government since it
alone has the exclusive authority to enter into agreements with foreign
powers. 96  States are constitutionally forbidden to deal directly with
foreign authorities and so their hands are tied in any effort to
91 Compare Garrett Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968), and
James K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of Global
Warming, 15 INT'L SECURIFY 110, 119 (1991) (contending that Global Warming is a
prime example of the 'tragedy of the commons' since the "full costs of efforts to mitigate
harmful emissions by one state will often be borne fully by that state, while the benefits
of such actions are diffused throughout the global community."), with Kirsten H. Engel,
Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54, 55 (2005) (discussing why, empirically, despite economic logic,
"small subglobal jurisdictions, such as state and local governments in the United States"
are doing things to "mitigate their comparatively minor contribution to a global
environmental phenomenon.").
92 Alternatives to burning fossil fuels are simply more expensive and therefore, at least at
the current level of technology, if a country wants to cut GHG emissions it must either
produce less or take on a more costly energy input.
Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
293, 319 (2005).
94 id
9 Although important, this factor alone is not dispositive and should be considered along
with all the other factors surrounding state action when determining whether a particular
state global warming initiative is appropriate.
96 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (forbidding states from entering "into any Agreement
or Compact .. . with a foreign Power.").
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comprehensively address global warming.9 7  Certainly, states have the
ability to unilaterally address GHG emissions in their own jurisdictions,
but they do not have the capability, as the federal government does, to
unite with other countries to forge a comprehensive solution to the global
warming problem. Remember, the issue addressed in this section is not
whether states can regulate global warming, but whether the state or the
federal government is better equipped to more efficiently and effectively
solve the problem. The federal government's ability to interact with
foreign nations is an additional tool it can utilize in the fight against global
warming. States simply do not have this tool in their repertoire. A recent
example of this federal tool in action in the global warming context is
President Obama's December 2009 visit to the United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen. At that conference, President Obama
worked with key leaders from over twenty nations - including China,
India, and Brazil - in an attempt to solidify commitments to emissions
cuts that would be open to international review.98 Although the results of
the conference in Copenhagen are somewhat disappointing, the conference
itself illustrates the rather obvious point that the federal government is
better positioned than the states to forge an international solution relating
to global warming.
Another related point that seems to favor leaving the regulation of
GHG emissions to the federal government is that "piecemeal integration of
state-level climate change policies might be challenged as interfering with
a purported federal government policy of withholding domestic legal
action on GHG emissions in order to maximize the bargaining chips
available for international climate negotiations." 99 Under this "bargaining
97 id
9 8 Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Negotiates 'Copenhagen Accord' With Senate Climate
Fight in Mind, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-
copenhagen-accord-with-senat-6121 .html. One key player praised Obama's work at the
conference calling it a "[h]ome run." Id He also said that Obama "[s]atisfied the
Europeans. Made China into a major world player, but made them accountable. Elevated
India, Brazil and South Africa to world stage. Cut an important side deal with Russians
on arms control." Id.
9 Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REv.
1621, 1625 (2008).
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chip theory," the federal government should be allowed to control all of
the GHG emission regulations domestically in order to have the ability to
coerce other nations into regulating GHG emissions.100 Global warming
requires action at an international level; in order for the United States to
effectively facilitate a global solution, the federal government must have
exclusive control of climate change policy within the country (at least
under this theory).
Even ignoring the global dimension of global warming, a
nationally uniform solution would be more desirable than a state-by-state
patchwork solution for several reasons. First, every single state in the
union is both affected by and contributes to the problem. Such a large,
pervasive national problem is best addressed by the federal government
which, due to its size and scope, is more institutionally equipped to
remedy the problem quickly and thoroughly. Second, national uniformity
in the regulation of GHG emissions gives industries the ability to operate
their businesses under a single standard instead of having to comply with
fifty separate, distinct state regulations. One national standard would
create predictability and business certainty. It would also allow businesses
to more smoothly expand across state lines, which ultimately benefits both
consumers and state residents.' 0 Finally, regulation at the federal level
would prevent industry forum shopping or any possible "race to the
bottom" between states. The fear would be that states would compete
with each other over jobs created by business by promulgating more and
more lax GHG emissions standards. This "chaotic federalism" creates a
complex, multilayered quilt of policies with no necessary connections,
consistency, coherence or compatibility.' 02  A single unitary approach
100 "[T]he federal government can, as a matter of its foreign affairs expertise, determine
that it is better to withhold domestic, legally enforced reductions in order to threaten
more effectively China, India, Brazil, and other large emitters with the prospect of
mutually assured destruction, should those nations fail to agree to binding multilateral
reductions." Id. at 1640.
1o1 It is cheaper for firms to comply with one national standard as opposed to attempting
to adjust their products and practices to fifty separate standards. Assuming a competitive
market, these costs savings would be passed along to consumers.
102 David Hodas, State Initiatives, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW, supra
note 76, at 344.
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facilitated by the national government simply makes more sense than an
unconnected, incoherent state-by-state approach.
The federalist structure of our government is designed to provide
two different levels of government, each distinctly positioned to serve the
needs of the people. Through specialization, the population can be better
served. As discussed above, the nature of global warming itself, along
with both foreign and domestic concerns, point to a federal solution to the
problem. Efficiency, as a value of federalism, cannot be used to justify the
state-led approach sustained in Connecticut.
2. The Litigation Tool
This point is further amplified by the fact that courts are hardly the
most ideal place to form global warming regulation. In efficiency terms,
the judiciary is the institution in our government that is most ill-equipped
to attempt to cap GHG emissions and monitor continued compliance for
years (which is exactly what the state Attorneys General are asking the
court to do in Connecticut).10 3 "[C]ourts are not well-euipped to generate
and implement long-term resource management plans,"' 04 and the issue of
global warming is precisely that: a resource management plan. This is
because "global warming is an issue of how to manage a common natural
resource (the atmosphere) so that the human 'load' on the resource is or
will not push the resource beyond a 'tipping point."' 105  Even if, as a
matter of law, the suit should survive political question doctrine scrutiny,
from an efficiency perspective, the judiciary is not the branch of
government we want making the difficult policy questions surrounding
global warming. The district court in Connecticut raised a host of these
policy questions, including "whether the power industry or its consumers
103 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 4, at Prayer for Relief (requesting the court
"[p]ermanently enjoin[] . .. each defendant to abate its contribution to the nuisance by
requiring it to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce them by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade.").
David A. Dana, The Mismatch between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming 3
(Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Paper No. 08-16, Law &
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should bear the costs of emission reductions, . . what the economic
implications of abatement would be, and what the implications would be
for the nation's energy independence, and by extension, it's national
security."l06 The legislature, not the judiciary, is best equipped to
investigate and answer these tough questions, and therefore litigation is
not the most optimal avenue to approach global warming.
Proponents of so-called "common-law environmentalism" have
strongly advocated for the judicial creation of environmental law pointing
to the rigidity of command-and-control regulation,' 0 7 the absence of
federal action on the issue,108 the policy-framing and media coverage
benefits of litigation itself,109 and the generation of policy relevant
information."l 0 These are all valid points and should be given due
consideration. Nevertheless, these factors are greatly out-weighed by the
benefits of addressing the issue in the other branches of government. The
legislature is the best venue to address the complex scientific, normative,
and ethical questions raised by the issue of global warming,' both
because it is institutionally equipped to investigate the multifarious
matters surrounding the issue and because it is more directly in tune to the
'
06Id. at 7.
107 Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 705, 706 (2008).
108 Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate
Change, Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets Into Common Law
Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1563 (2007); see also Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort
Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policymaking: Evaluating Climate Change Litigation
in Light ofLessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1837, 1869 (2008) ("In an ideal world, a democratic legislative process to control
climate-change would be preferable to the decisions of individual judges. But when the
legislative process has failed to produce results, the political argument for allowing
common law actions, that the legislative process may be paralyzed or captured, provides
a compelling justification for allowing the courts to hear the common law actions that
have been brought to date... . The existing common law can fill the vacuum.").
109 Lytton, supra note 108, at 1868 ("[P]laintiffs' claims have framed climate change in
terms of dramatic narratives linking greenhouse-gas emitters to environmental changes
that have imposed specific harms on identifiable victims. . . . These narratives, suggests
Hunter, make "climate change more tangible and more immediate, which significantly
changes the tone of the climate debate.").
"old. at 1870.
" See Dana, supra note 104, at 13.
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will of the people. Additionally, litigation is inappropriate because
"claims for climate change-related damages could become crushingly
expensive and cause high transaction costs."1l2 Other factors include that
the damages associated with global warming involve largely "prospective"
harm that has not yet fully come to fruition"' 3 and that because litigation is
highly unlikely to actually hold a significant number of polluters liable, it
will hardly make a dent in reducing GHG emissions.1 4  Additional
considerations flow from criticisms of public law litigation generally:
fewer interested stakeholders may participate in adjudication as compared
to legislation,"l5 judges are generalists who do not have the capacity to
fully analyze specialized information," 6 judges must focus on the facts of
the unique case before them and therefore are ill-equipped to make more
general policy decisions which require analysis of the big picture," 7
potential judicial remedies are not flexible across time or in the form they
take," 8 et cetera.11 9 When one aggregates these factors against the use of
12 Reimund Schwarze, Liability for Climate Change: The Benefits, the Costs, and the
Transaction Costs, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1947, 1947 (2007).
113 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global
Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1692-93 (2007).
114 Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens
ofa Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 701, 701-02 (2008) ("[E]ven with a
strong plaintiff--the Inuit people of the Arctic region--and vulnerable defendants--U.S.
electricity generating companies--the prospects of a successful lawsuit for climate change
related damages are mixed. Current law seems to suggest that liability is slightly less
probable than not, but certainly not inconceivable. However, the tenuous bases for
liability in this hypothetical lawsuit, and the rarity of the characteristics of this plaintiff
and these defendants that make this lawsuit plausible, suggests that climate change
litigation is unlikely to play a significant role in arresting global climate change. In the
end, the bulk of the work in reducing greenhouse gases must be undertaken by nation-
states and international agreements.").
115 DONALD L. HOROWIrZ, THE COuRTs AND SOCIAL POLICY 23 (1977).
116 See id. at 25-30. "On most important social policy issues that come to them, judges
are bound to be novices." Id. at 30.
117 Id. at 33-35. Adjudication is piecemeal: "[r]elated issues, not raised by the instant
dispute, must generally await later litigation." Id. at 35.
"' Id. at 34-35 ("[T]he courts have only the option of issuing coercive orders:
injunctions... . Legislators and administrators, on the other hand, have a wider range of
tools in their kit. They may resort to the same kinds of sanctions judges invoke or they
may use taxation, incentives and subsidies ... interventions in the marketplace, the
establishment of new organizations .... ).
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litigation and weighs them against the potential benefits of climate change
litigation, it is hard to argue that litigation is the most efficient means of
address global warming.
It is important to note that these criticisms of litigation do not
generally apply to cases like Massachusetts v. EPA, where the remedy
involved merely prodding a federal government agency into action on the
issue of global warming. The court realized its proper role when it
concluded the case by saying the following:
[t]his is a straightforward administrative-law case, in which
Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad
discretion, not to us but to an executive agency. No matter
how important the underlying policy issues at stake, this
Court has no business substituting its own desired outcome
for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.120
Unlike in Connecticut, the Massachusetts court did not contemplate the
implementation of a court-created long term resource management plan or
set off the possibility for huge unrestrained liability. It decided a question
of administrative law and left the details surrounding the facts and
solutions to a well-equipped administrative body that Congress created for
the job.
For the above-mentioned reasons, the federalism value of
efficiency cannot be used to justify Connecticut. This is because the
federal government is in a much better position to address the problem and
the tool used by the states, litigation, is not the best means to achieve a
solution.
D. Diversity
An additional federalism value related to the decentralized nature
of our government involves the perpetuation and preservation of regional
diversity.121 This value is primarily concerned with preserving the already
119 See generally, HOROWITZ, supra note 115.120 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2007).
121 See supra text accompanying note 41.
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fast eroding cultural heterogeneity of our natioD122 and allowing citizens to
choose how to regulate themselves on important issues such as marriage,
euthanasia, and property taxes.123  It is hard to see how Connecticut
advances the promotion of regional diversity since it is involves an
attempt by states from across the nation to impose their policy choices on
other states spread across the South and Midwest. As noble as those
policy choices may be, the lawsuit cannot be portrayed as justified using
this value since, if anything, it seeks to inhibit regional choice and
autonomy, and to ensure that other regions acquiesce to the plaintiff states'
particular environmental tastes. Since Connecticut involves the
imposition of policy on one state by the actions of another, it cannot be
considered protective of regional diversity in any sense.
E. Participation and Accountability
Federalism has been lauded because it increases public
participation in government and facilitates accountability by creating state
and local governments that are closer to the populace than the federal
government.124 Accountability is much more than merely electoral
accountability; "[a]ccountability in a democracy means responsiveness on
the part of those petitioned." 25 Therefore, the reasoning goes, since state
governments are closer to the people (i.e., they have fewer constituents to
serve and are consequently more directly accessible to those they
represent), giving states broad control allows the people to be more
directly involved and the government to be held more directly
accountable. In some situations accountability is blurred, for example
when the federal government "commandeers" a state agency or
apparatus126 and the people are unsure as to which level of government to
122 Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 558 (1995) ("Our national culture
is already too homogenized to expect great differences between the states, but what
cultural differences still remain should not be further eroded by central legislation
without good reason.").
123 Ryan, supra note 41, at 613.
124 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
125 Friedman, supra note 14, at 394.
126 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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hold accountable for the behavior of the state government.127
Accountability is also blurred when the federal government regulates in
areas traditionally reserved for the state governments.128 Consequently,
state or federal control over a particular issue can be said to foster
accountability only to the extent that such control does not blur the lines of
accountability itself. Indeed, "[fjederalism serves to assign political
responsibility, not to obscure it."l 29
On its face, Connecticut might appear to foster accountability and
participation not only because the action is being instigated by actors on
the state level (and therefore is happening closer to the populace) but
because the Attorneys General ("AGs") of each plaintiff-state are directly
elected and therefore directly accountable to the people. This analysis
may prove to be somewhat simplistic for two reasons. First, the lawsuit
does not involve a single government entity and this fact has the potential
to blur the lines of accountability. Second, there are serious problems with
allowing a few state AGs to create national policy. Each issue will be
addressed in turn below.
In Connecticut, if the plaintiff-states are successful in enjoining the
defendants and the court orders a complex policy that caps the emission of
GHGs and oversees systematic reductions (which is what the plaintiff-
states have requested),130 it will be unclear as to which level and which
branch of government the populace should hold accountable should they
want to adjust or abandon the policy implemented by the judiciary. The
federal judiciary would be essentially creating a regulation promulgated
by some states for the implementation in other states. If voters do not like
the result of this judicial GHG scheme, they do not know "which bums to
127 Ryan, supra note 41, at 606 ("[F]ederalism is often championed as a means of
ensuring that government remains accountable to the electorate by enabling citizens to
recognize which elected officials are responsible for which policies (and to reward or
punish policy choices accordingly.)").
128 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were
the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state
concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory.").
129 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992).
130 See Connecticut Complaint, supra note 4, at Prayer for Relief.
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throw out."' 3 ' Should they vote-out and/or lobby against the state AGs
that initiated the litigation to express disapproval of the litigation? If so, in
which state? Should the voters lobby their federal Congressmen or
Representatives to pass legislation that would displace the lawsuit? Or is
there some pathway in the states in which the defendants reside to express
discontentment and adjust the system set in place? Or maybe one should
intervene in the course of the judicial enforcement (which the plaintiff-
states would like to continue for at least a decade).132 The bottom-line is
that once a judicial remedy is initiated, it is extremely unclear for the
average citizen who to hold accountable. A dissatisfied constituent could
easily think to turn against the plaintiff-state AGs, the defendant-states
themselves, the federal government, or even the judiciary. Any judicial
remedy in this circumstance would obscure political responsibility and
leave citizens guessing as to whom to hold accountable for the GHG
policy implemented by the court. "Federalism serves to assign political
responsibility, not to obscure it"' 33 and this lawsuit fails to serve this goal.
Additional accountability concerns flow from the scenario created
in Connecticut where, in the absence of federal regulations in a field, state
AGs can pursue their own regulatory agendas, even when those agendas
have significant national ramifications.1 34 The result of this situation is as
follows:
First, [it] . . . denies the citizens of other states the
opportunity to influence the regulatory process . . . .
Second, regulation accomplished through litigation is more
difficult to overturn than regulation accomplished through
legislative or administrative channels, making it less
responsive to political changes. Thus, [state] AG
regulation can be less politically accountable over time, as
well as across states.13 5
131 See Ryan, supra note 41, at 606.132 Connecticut Complaint, supra note 4, at 1 6.
'3 Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 636.
134 Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory
Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CAL. L. REv. 885, 886 (2007).
131 Id. at 887.
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For example, if a voter in Mississippi does not like the fact that the power
plant he works for is at risk of potentially very costly liability from a
lawsuit instigated by a state AG from California, the Mississippian is
practically powerless in making his voice heard as he cannot use his vote
to dissuade the California AG from pursuing the litigation. Electoral
accountability is greatly diminished when one state AG can influence and
indeed define national policy, which is exactly the situation in Connecticut
where AGs from a few states are influencing global warming policy in as
many as twenty other states.
A closely related point flows from the fact that the office of the
state AG itself is very autonomous and the policy choices an AG makes
(including which lawsuits to pursue) cannot easily be controlled by the
governor, the legislature, or any other state institution.' 36  When this
extreme autonomy is coupled with the fact that the AG is permitted to act
in a politically entrepreneurial fashion, and is usually a self-interested
politician seeking to advance his or her political career, there is a serious
danger that the Attorney General may stray significantly from the AG's
core function of law enforcement.137 The institution of the state AG's
office is a very powerful and active one. The fact that one state AG can
take dramatic action to boldly affect national policy has the potential to be
very progressive, but it also has the potential to steer the country in a
reckless direction that is not easily corrected by a discontented populace.
While aggressively addressing global warming is arguably a very
progressive goal for which state AGs should be applauded, one should
also consider how much say the people bearing the brunt of the policy
have in determining the means and remedy employed by the AGs. When
state AGs act on a national stage, their accountability is greatly diminished
and their influence is greatly expanded. This is exactly the situation in
Connecticut where several state AGs, accountable only to the constituents
in their own states, are pushing policy (through litigation) which will
greatly affect the residents in twenty other states, all of whom are unable
Id. at 890.
Id. at 895-96 ("[A]n attorney general who aspires to higher office, such as governor or
U.S. Senator, has an incentive to raise his profile in policy areas beyond that of law
enforcement ... in seeking to raise money and build support in a bid for higher office, the
attorney general must try to reach out to interest groups that may not have a direct interest
in the attorney general's core function of law enforcement.").
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to use their political strength to express an opinion about the regulation 38
forced upon them. With respect to participation in government, it is
difficult for a citizen to participate in government when the primary force
driving policy on such an important issue as global warming is located in a
distant state AG office.
The federalism values of accountability and participation are not
served by the global warming lawsuit brought by state AGs in the
Connecticut case. Not only does the lawsuit dramatically increase the risk
that the lines of political accountability will be blurred, but it unduly
concentrates power in small, driven, state institutions that are not
accountable to a vast majority of the people affected by those institutions.
For these reasons, any federalism justification for the lawsuit grounded on
the values of accountability and participation seems highly suspect.
F. Competing Sovereigns
Federalism maximizes social benefits to U.S. residents by
facilitating competition between sovereigns. There are two dimensions to
the idea of competing sovereigns: horizontal (states competing against
other states) and vertical (states competing against the federal
government).
Horizontal competition happens when a mobile citizenry
"competes with their feet" and moves to the state with the most desirable
social policies. This concept does not fit perfectly onto Connecticut
because the lawsuit does not confer concrete benefits on its citizenry. At
least theoretically, people will move to a state to reap the benefits of the
policies implemented by that state. For example, a gay couple might
decide to move to New Hampshire in order to take advantage of the
recently passed legislation legalizing same-sex marriage. 4 0  The
competing sovereign theory makes the most sense where concrete policy
benefits are conferred to the moving resident upon arrival. This is not the
138 I have been using the term "regulation" when characterizing the judicial remedy
sought by the plaintiff-states because the relief sought (a cap on GHG emissions,
followed by a guided reduction) functions exactly like a top-down regulation.
139 See Ryan, supra note 41, at 614.140 Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 2009, at A19.
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case in Connecticut since, arguably, every resident of the U.S. reaps the
same benefit from any GHG abatement ordered by the lawsuit, regardless
of where they are living. One does not need to move from California to
Mississippi in order to take advantage of the reduced GHG emissions in
Mississippi caused by the litigation. The benefits and detriments of global
climate change are not localized; there is no safe haven from global
warming in areas that emit only a very small amount of GHG
emissions. 14 1 In fact, this is the very premise of the Connecticut lawsuit,
where the GHG emissions of a fuel-fired electric generating facility
located in Kentucky arguably contribute to the increased salinization of
marshes and tidelands in the San Francisco Bay Area.14 2
One could argue that individuals would move to the plaintiff-states
in order to show support for environmentally progressive lawsuits.
Residents would then be moving to states that appealed to their
environmental policy tastes. While this migration is conceivable, it seems
highly unlikely that a citizen would move solely to show support for state-
sponsored litigation. Even if residents did in fact move, it would
ironically lead to a weakened national position toward global warming. If
all the like-minded advocates of aggressively attacking global warming
concentrated themselves in a few single states, then their power to affect
national change would be reduced.14 3
The concept of vertical competition between the federal
government and the states makes much more sense in this context. The
federal government has failed to act on global warming despite the cries of
the people, and therefore the states have had to act instead by taking such
steps as filing lawsuits like Connecticut in order to get the ball rolling on
141 This is one of the reasons why there is a tension between the worlds developed nations
and developing nations. The developed nations are by far the primary emitters of GHGs,
yet the developing countries must bear a substantial amount of the deleterious effects of
Global Warming, even though their contribution to the problem has, to date, been very
minimal.
142 The rise in salt levels of the marshes would be due to the accelerated sea-level rise
from unrestrained global warming. It threatens vital breeding grounds for numerous
s ecies of fish and shellfish. Connecticut Complaint, supra note 4, at % 95, 173.
I This situation would be somewhat analogous to gerrymandering where all the
members of one party are highly concentrated in a few districts, leaving the rest of the
districts, along with the entire victory, to the other party.
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the issue. Connecticut can be viewed as prodding the federal government
into action by instigating an incredibly imperfect solution to global
warming that only involves a small percentage of GHG emitters in the
U.S. and taps the institutionally ill-equipped judiciary to make the
complex decisions and oversee the monitoring of a GHG reduction
scheme. From this perspective, the lawsuit can be seen as merely an
attempt to prod the federal government into action on the issue by creating
the possibility of a courtroom remedy that leaves few interests truly happy.
Industry is not happy because Connecticut exposes them to huge liability
and gives them little say in the solution; environmentalists are not happy
because it is at best an incomplete remedy; and the general public is left
wondering why it took a lawsuit to address global warming. Inevitably,
the federal government will heed the will of the people and cross swords
with the states on this issue by taking steps to concretely address global
warming and thereby displacing the unpopular Connecticut decision. The
states drew their Connecticut sword not necessarily with the intention of
actually producing a tangible judicial remedy, but with the intention of
provoking the federal government into action and achieving a national
approach to global warming by ultimately having their Connecticut
lawsuit displaced.
This is a very unconventional analysis of "vertical competition,"
since from this perspective, states want to lose to the federal government
and have power over the issue shifted to Washington. The states' purpose
for filing the lawsuit was to entice the federal government into addressing
the issue and not an attempt to grab the global warming issue for
themselves. The more traditional concept of vertical competition usually
entails a particular level of government winning the hearts of the people
by showing that they can more competently regulate a particular issue.144
Under this analysis, the states would be rewarded when the people, on that
particular issue, give them more responsibility and thereby reduce the role
of the federal government. From this perspective, if Connecticut is
displaced by federal regulation, the states will have lost the battle, since
any displacement will represent the people's choice that the federal
government deserves to regulate the issue of global warming, not the
states. Using this analysis, the states are competing for the trust of the
58
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people by supplying a novel, aggressive remedy to global warming. The
federal government has failed to provide a solution that adequately
satisfies the needs of the people, and consequently the states have
intervened to fill the void, in order to win the people. Therefore, vertical
competition can be interpreted in two entirely separate ways. Either the
state is intentionally offering an imperfect solution in an attempt to prod
the federal government into action, or the state is attempting to offer a
superior solution in the hopes of gaining the peoples trust on the issue.
While the horizontal competition analysis falls far short of
providing any sort of federalist justification for the Connecticut lawsuit,
the vertical competition analysis may be considered a valid federalism
value that could be seen as justifying the lawsuit. Any justification for the
suit based on horizontal competition is baseless as the global warming
policy underlying Connecticut fails to motivate people to "vote with their
feet" due to the diffusive nature of climate change and the structure of the
lawsuit. Justifications founded on vertical competition, however, are
much more persuasive as the lawsuit can be thought of as satisfying the
needs of the people by either prodding the federal government into action
on the issue or by filling a federal void on global warming. Whether the
vertical competition value served by Connecticut is alone sufficient to
prove that federalism justifies such lawsuits is, however, a separate matter.
G. Interstate Pollution and the Federal Common Law ofNuisance:
Federalist Concerns Involving Bias and Limited State Sovereignty
The claim in Connecticut rests on the federal common law of
nuisance. 14 5 The federal common law of nuisance creates a claim of
action whereby one state can obtain a remedy for the deleterious effects
caused by pollution originating in another state without a) having to
declare war or get into the game of carrots and sticks; or b) face the
potential legal biases of filing suit in the polluting state's court. Thus the
federal common law is designed to provide a remedy to states that
minimizes biases and addresses the fact that states are limited sovereigns
and cannot use all the tools of sovereignty (such as war and diplomacy).
The federal common law of nuisance is generally used in a situation where
145 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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state A pollutes, thereby harming state B.146 This is not the situation in
Connecticut, where every single state and nation is emitting carbon
dioxide, and therefore collectively harming state B. GHGs are not
localized pollutants and consequently a pollutant emitted in one nation or
state amplifies the effect of global warming as a whole and is felt by all
parts of the globe equally. 1 The previously mentioned two justifications
for the federal common law do not easily fit this scenario. Each will be
addressed below.
The states' limited sovereignty prevents states from using war or
diplomacy to address the wrongs committed against them by other states.
The federal common law of nuisance was designed to take the place of
these tools and act as a useful mechanism for interstate disputes regarding
pollution. However, due to the nature of global warming, it is hard to
characterize the problem as merely an interstate dispute where state A
pollutes, thereby harming state B. "Global warming . . . is not best
conceived as a binary pollution dispute between producers and recipients
of 'pollution'; rather, global warming is an issue of how to manage a
common natural resource (the atmosphere)." 48 Without clear, coherent
lines of causation running between polluter and the victim of pollution,14 9
the interstate dispute resolution justifications for the federal common law
breaks down. As one commentator has noted, "climate change is best
conceptualized as an overexploitation-of-a-commons problem . . . and
public nuisance law has never been touted as, or served to effectively
address, the tragedy of the commons."' 5 0
146 See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
147 Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND
U.S. LAW, supra note 76, at 5-6.
148 Dana, supra note 104, at 3.
149 "Unless the suit brings in all the major greenhouse gas emitters in the world, it will be
impossible for the plaintiff to show (or even really allege) that it is more likely than not
that the defendants' emissions, and in of themselves, caused the warming that allegedly
caused or will cause the harm to the state. Greenhouse gas emissions, individually, do
not translate into warming or indeed any identifiable harm at all. Moreover, it will be
impossible to show that the defendants' emissions were even part of the total emissions
that caused the alleged harm, since even in the absence of the defendants' emissions, it
will be plausible to suppose that the same degree of warming would have occurred or will
occur." Id. at 10.
"s1 d. at 11-12.
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Although the interstate dispute resolution justification (i.e., the
limited state sovereign argument) for the federal common law fails in the
global warming context, there is still the argument that some sort of
federal common law should exist, since the laws of a particular state may
well be biased toward protecting its own interests against the interests of
other states. The fear presumably is that courts and legislatures in states
with many GHG emitters might be more hesitant to adopt global warming
regulations and could systematically be biased against out-of-state
pollution victims. This logic, however, supports a nationally uniform
legislative policy on the issue much more than it supports the use of the
piecemeal use of federal common law. State courts and legislatures may
very well be biased in favor of their own interests over the interests of out-
of-staters, but the same goes for state AGs who have vigorously advocated
for the rights of their own citizens. Courts, at least, are obligated to apply
the impartial blind hand of justice, whereas state AGs can flagrantly
advance the interests of their own state at the expense of others.
Therefore, if federalism requires that a state be protected from the threat of
bias from other state courts, it also (and even more forcefully so) requires
a state to be protected from the biases that come from a few state AGs
attempting to create national policy. In the context of global warming, the
federal common law of nuisance does in fact eliminate potentially biased
state courts and legislatures. A state injured by global warming will not
have to present its claim in the courts of a heavily industrial state.
Nevertheless, the federal common law of nuisance fails to address the
threat of self-interested AGs pursuing their states' own agenda at the
expense of other states' interests. A nationally uniform policy that fully
addresses all states' interests would be far less biased than a system where
a small number of states concentrated in the Northeast are allowed to
impose their agenda on a great number of states throughout the country.
Although the goal of addressing global warming is wonderful and should
be pursued to the fullest extent, an approach controlled by a small number
of state AGs cannot be characterized as unbiased.
The protection from interstate bias and the accommodation of the
inherent limited sovereignty of U.S. states are important values that are
meant to protect and fortify the federalist structure of our government.
Although these values do not flow directly from federalism, they are
necessary safeguards designedfor federalism and can consequently be key
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justifications for actions taken by states and the federal government. As
explained above, neither justification fully supports the Connecticut
litigation.
PART III: CONCLUSION
Within the past year, EPA has issued refulatory actions designed
to address issues relating to climate change.' 5  Certain thresholds for
GHG emissions have already been set for stationary sources152 and a
national program designed to reduce GHG emissions from vehicles has
been initiated.'5 3 These are important steps by the federal government in
the fight against climate change. Regardless of whether these federal
regulations or other future legislation actually displaces Connecticut, this
Article presents an important framework for analyzing state sponsored
litigation by looking at whether such activity is justified by, or at least
congruent with, the goals and values of federalism.
In the case of Connecticut, the various rationales underlying the
federalist structure of our government fail to adequately justify the use of
state sponsored litigation to address global warming. The states are not
acting as "laboratories of innovation" since they fail to contain their
experiment within state borders. Liberty is not being protected because
government power is in no way being curbed by the lawsuit. Additionally,
the suit is a rather inefficient way to address global warming, both because
the issue is international in character and because litigation is not the best
tool to address it. No regional diversity interests are being satisfied. The
lines of accountability are obscured and a nationally unaccountable
institution is left to set national policy. Although vertical sovereign
competition is served, as the states are arguably filling a regulatory void
and prodding the federal government into action, horizontal competition is
in no way applicable. Finally, the federal common law of nuisance seems
inappropriate since it would be simplistic to characterize global warming
151 See EPA, Climate Change Regulatory Initiatives,
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
152 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
153 See EPA, Transportation and Climate Regulations,
http://epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010)
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as an interstate dispute. Any potential state bias remedied by the federal
common law is small compared to the state bias that would be remedied
by nationally uniform regulation. By applying the various federalism
values to the lawsuit and aggregating their weights, it becomes clear that
Connecticut abuses rather than utilizes our federalist system.
It is important to note that the ultimate conclusion of this Article,
which is skeptical of a certain type of state action on climate change, does
not necessarily apply to various other state attempts to address global
warming. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he GHG challenge involves
a multiplicity of sources, varied risks and harms in different locations,
changing science and engineering, and an array of scale challenges. No
one regulator can effectively regulate at all levels."' 54  A diversity of
approaches to global warming is in fact a valuable consequence of
federalism that should be utilized - just not with interstate litigation like
Connecticut.
154 William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1617 (2007).
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